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Two cases during the Survey period involve priorities between
mortgages and mechanics' liens. They are Southern Blow Pipe &
Roofing Co. v. Grubb,' and First State Bank v. Stacey.2 Before giving
a detailed consideration of these cases, perhaps it would not be amiss
to sketch in a little background by way of the general nature and
scope of these mechanics' liens, as well as a few words concerning
priorities with other liens. This introductory material may make the
cases at hand a little more easily understood.
Origin Nature and Scope of the Lien
The term "mechanics' lien" includes all sorts of liens not only of
mechanics, but of laborers, materialmen and other furnishers3
These liens have no likeness at common law; they are a creature
of statute.4 We know when the idea entered into our legislation and
the occasion. These liens originated, we are told, with a Maryland
statute of 1791, and the motive was to stimulate the building of the
City of Washington. 5 So popular did the idea become, that every state
now has a mechanic "lien law" of some sort.0 Because these liens are
wholly statutory and because the laws creating them have been ex-
tremely varied, generalizations are extremely diffictilt. 7 Furthermore,
case law is not reliable because the decisions are meaningless except
with reference to the particular statute under which each arose and
the precise language of the statute under which the case arose.
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 260 S.W.2d 191 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
2. 261 S.W.2d 245 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
3. The Tennessee legislature has labeled these liens "Mechanics' and
Furnishers' Liens." Relevant code sections are contained in TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 7913-7959 (Williams 1934).
4. See 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 351 (1943); McDonnell v. Amo, 162 Tenn. 36,
41, 34 S.W.2d 212 (1931).
5. See 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 351 (1943). "The origin of such laws in
America arose from the desire to establish and improve, as readily as possible,
the city of Washington. In 1791, at a meeting of the Commissioners appointed
for such a purpose, both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were present,
and a memorial was adopted urging the General Assembly of Maryland to
pass an act securing to master builders a lien on houses erected and land
occupied. The requested law was enacted December 19, 1791." See Moore-
Mansfield Construction Co. v. Indianapolis, New Castle and Toledo Ry., 179
Ind. 356, 101 NE. 296, 301 
(1913).
6. See OsBoRNE, MORTGAGES § 214 (1951).
7. Ibid.
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The fundamental idea of the mechanics' lien is that it affords
security for the payment of the claims of those who enhance the value
of the land to which the lien attaches by labor or materials in con-
struction or improvement.3 The earlier lien laws furnished protection
only to master-builders But today virtually every segment composing
the construction industry is granted liens of varying extent for labor,
services, or materials furnished. Included in the protection of the lien
statutes are contractors, subcontractors, material dealers and laborers.10
Although a good many states extend the protection to architects, land-
scape architects, engineers and surveyors," Tennessee does not extend
her protection quite so far. Thus, in Tennessee, architects' services,"
and the superintendent who merely supervises the work of laborers 3
do not fall within the scope of the lien. Neither does the pale of pro-
tection in Tennessee extend to wages of a nightwatchman, and such
items as temporary heating, temporary lights, water, stationery for
the contractor, sharpening of saws, plate-glass insurance or a tarpaulin
to cover materials.14
These mechanics' liens are not limited to those with whom the owner
dealt with directly; the acts extend the coverage to persons who had
no direct dealings with the owner.15
Conceivably, under some statutes the claims of the ancillary con-
tractor could exceed the contract price, 6 but the most prevalent type,
referred to as the "New York" system, measures the liability of the
owner's property by the price stated in the original contract with the
general contractor.17 Tennessee is one of the New York type. The
Tennessee statute expressly provides that the claims secured by a lien
for labor done and materials furnished shall in no case exceed the
amount agreed to be paid by the owner in his contract with the
8. See Chickasaw Hotel Co. v. Construction Co., 135 Tenn. 305, 314-15, 186
S.W. 115 (1916); OsBoRNE, MORTGAGES § 214 (1951); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7114,
7927 (Williams 1934).
9. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 214 (1951).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7914, 7927 (Williams 1934); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §
214 (1951).
11. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 214 (1951).
12. Howe v. Kancher-Hodges & Co., 13 Tenn. App. 367 (W.S. 1930); Thomp-
son v. Baxter, 92 Tenn. 305, 21 S.W. 668 (1892).
13. Harris v. Marble, 138 Tenn. 676, 200 S.W. 824 (1917).
14. Variety Fire Door Co. v. Hanson-Worden Co., 10 Tenn. App. 254 (W.S.
1929).
15. "Every journeyman or other person contracted with or employed to
work on the buildings, fixtures, machinery, or improvements, or to furnish
materials for the same, whether such journeyman, furnisher, or other person
was employed or contracted with by the person who originally contracted with
the owner of the premises, or by an immediate or remote sub-contractor, shall
has this lien for his work or material.... ." (Italics supplied).TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 7927 (Williams 1934). Code section 7914 provides for the lien when the
claimant contracted directly with the owner or his agent.
16. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 214 (1951).
17. See 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 351 (1943); 36 YALE L. J. 129 (1926).
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original contractor.18 That statute can be a delusion, however, since
the subcontractor may look to the property regardless of payments
made by the owner to the contractor.19 Fortunately, the owner can
protect himself against such double liability by an indemnity bond.20
To what does the lien attach in Tennessee? It extends only to the
interest of the owner in the real property and improvements, existing
at the time of the commencement of operations or thereafter ac-
quired.21 The lien includes the building, structure, fixture, or improve-
ment as well as the lot or land.2 2 Any person other than a laborer
may, as a part of his contract, waive any part of lien, but a laborer may
not waive his right of lien.2 3 Likewise, the contractor may be estopped
to assert his lien.24 But the estoppel of the contractor will not neces-
sarily estop a subcontractor who has furnished materials.
25
When does the lien attach? This is of special concern to a competing
lien claimant such as a mortgagee. While the lien attaches at different
times in different states,2 16 the Tennessee statute provides that the lien
relates to and takes effect from the time of visible commencement of
operations.27
Priority Between Mechanics' Liens and Mortgages
It seems well-established that if the mechanics' lien has attached
to the property first it prevails over a subsequent mortgage on the
property, both as to the land and the improvement.28 In this connec-
18. TsEN. CODE AxN. § 7937 (Williams 1934); Variety Fire Door Co. v.
Hanson-Worden Co., 10 Tenn. App. 354 (Wis. 1929).
19. Under the Tennessee law the subcontractor may look to property re-
gardless of payment by the owner. While subcontractors are chargeable with
notice of terms and conditions of the original contract and are bound to make
materials and labor furnished by them conform thereto, they may look to the
property itself for satisfaction of their liens regardless of whether the owner
has paid the contractor the entire amount of the contract price. Richmond
Screw Anchor Co. v. Minter Co., 156 Tenn. 19, 300 S.W. 574 (1927).
20. This is provided for in the code. TENx. CODE ANN. § 7932 (Williams 1934).
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7916 (Williams 1934). Thus, a life tenant cannot bind
his remainderman. Allen v. Brown, 14 Tenn. App. 405 (E.S. 1932). Nor will a
contract with the lessee give a lien on the lessor's interest. Reed v. Estes, 113
Tenn. 200, 80 S.W. 1086 (1904).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7917 (Williams 1934).
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7939 (Williams 1934).
24. Green v. Williams, 92 Tenn. 220, 21 S.W. 520 (1893).
25. Ibid.
26. There are at least four different points of time when the mechanics'
lien fastens to the property for the purpose of priority over other incum-
brancers. (1) It begins with the making of the contract between the owner
and mechanic. (2) The lien runs from the commencement of the building.
(3) The lien of each claimant commences to run from the time he began to
perform his labor or furnished the material. (4) There is no mechanics' lien
without filing, and priorities are determined solely with reference to the date
of filing. See Priorities between Mortgages and Mechanics' Liens, 36 YALE L. 3.
129, 131-33 (1926); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 214 (1951); Mechanics' Liens in
Virginia, 29 VA. L. REv. 121, 127 (1942).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7915 (Williams 1934).
28. TENN. CODE ANN. 7917 (Williams 1934); Electric Light Co. v. Gas Co.,
99 Tenn. 371, 42 S.W. 19 (1889); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 215 (1951); Mechanics'
Liens in Virginia, 29 VA. L. REv. 121, 127 (1942).
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tion it is of very considerable importance to be careful to determine
when the mechanics' lien does attach, for as we have just seen these
liens attach at various stages, depending upon the particular state
statute.-9 In Tennessee the lien attaches only from the time of visible
commencement of operations;30 and as to the persons contracting di-
rectly with the owner the lien continues for one year after the work
is finished or materials are furnished, and until the final decision of
any suit that may be brought within that time for its enforcement.,1
Presently we will see that the lien has a shorter duration where the
lienor's rights do not grow out of contractual relations directly with
the owner.
In order to preserve the lien, however, certain notification and
recording requirements may have to be met.
One such requirement concerns notification to the owner. Any
laborer or materialman whose contract was not with the owner, but
with the original contractor or an immediate or remote subcontractor,
shall have his lien only if he notifies the owner in writing 90 days
after the demolition or completion of the building or within 90 days
after the completion of his performance of his contract or his dis-
charge.3 2 In contrast to persons contracting directly with the owner
(whose lien lasts one year), these persons whose rights grow out of
contractual relations with the original contractor and subcontractor,
and not with the owner, have a lien for only 90 days from date of
notice, and until the final determination of any suit for enforcement
brought within that period.33
The Tennessee statute also provides that as the lien applies to the
owner it need not be recorded; but as concerns subsequent purchasers
and encumbrancers for a valuable consideration without notice, the
lien must be recorded within 90 days after the building is completed,
or after the contract of the lienor is terminated.34 The place of recorda-
tion is the office of the county register.35
But even as concerns subsequent encumbrancers without notice of
29. See note 26 upra.
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7915 (Williams 1934).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7917 (Williams 1934).
32. TNN. CODE ANN. §§ 7927, 7929 (Williams 1934); Phillips & Buttorff IPfg.Co. v. Campbell, 93 Tenn. 469, 471, 25 S.W. 961 (1894). If the contract is in
writing, a recordation of it constitutes notice of the lien. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 7918 (Williams 1934).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7927, 7929 (Williams 1934). A garnishor of theowner cannot take advantage of the omission of a lien claimant to institute asuit as required by this statute, where the owner was making no resistance to
the claim of the lienor, and there was an absence of fraud or collusion between
owner and lien claimant. Hamilton Nat'1 Bank v. Long, 189 Tenn. 562, 226
S.W.2d 293 (1949).
34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7919 (Williams 1934). While the lien need not berecorded as to the owner, if there is a written contract it may be recorded,
and such recordation shall be notice to all persons of the existence of the
lien. Id. at § 7918.
35. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7918, 7929 (Williams 1934).
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the mechanics' lien, the lienor will be protected against such an en-
cumbrancer who became such after the materials have been furnished
if the materialman records his lien in the office of the county register
within 90 days after the building is completed or the contract of the
lienor is terminated. So a mortgagee who takes a mortgage in Ten-
nessee cannot rely upon an examination of the records, but must make
investigation outside of them to discover and determine factual mat-
ters that frequently are not definite, for the reason that a mechanics'
lien relates back to the date of the visible commencement of the
work.86 Here one can see the advantages of the New York type of
statute, which relates the lien wholly to the day when the mechanics'
lien was recorded.37 Turning to the other side of the shield, however,
when there has been a "visible commencement" of a building, that fact
is sufficiently patent to put any prospective mortgagee on notice that
a lien might attach to this property for those improvements. More-
over, perhaps there is no great hardship in allowing the mechanics'
lien to relate back and be superior to that of the mortgagee. The me-
chanic or materialman is entitled to no lien until he has augmented
the value of the property, and then only to the amount, theoretically
at least, of such augmented value. This increased value of his security
is directly beneficial to the mortgagee. To save his mortgage, the
mortgagee may be required to make an increased investment in the
security, but the increased investment is measured by the increased
value.8  In balancing the conflicting interests of the materialmen and
the mortgagee, the legislatures incorporating this view in the statute
have seen fit to tip the scales slightly in favor of the materialman and
laborer.
No constitutional roadblock is thrown up from the fact that the
recording of the lien relates it back to the commencement of the work,
even though it hurts the intervening mortgagee who advanced the
money when the mechanics' lien was not recorded, providing the
statute giving the priority antedates the mortgage. The mortgage is
presumed to have been executed with reference to existing law. 9 But
even under the Tennessee type statute precedence will not be given
a mechanics' lien over a subsequent mortgage where the statutory
filing requirement has not been complied with; and the fact that actual
36. TENN. CODE AxN. §§ 7919, 7929 (Williams 1934). "The language of the
statute is that the claim must be ified within ninety days after the building is
completed, etc., but it is provided that during the full ninety day period the
lien shall be effective without registration. We think the meaning is clear."
Brown v. Brown & Co., 25 Tenn. App. 509, 513, 160 S.W.2d 431 (E.S. 1941). To
the same effect: Electric Light Co. v. Gas Co., 99 Tenn. 371, 42 S.W. 19 (1889);
Green v. Williams, 92 Tenn. 220, 21 S.W. 520 (1893) (priority over a purchaser).
37. See Priorities between Mortgages and Mechanics' Liens, 36 YALE L. J.
129, 133 (1926); Mechanics' Liens in Virginia, 29 VA. L. REv. 121, 127 (1942).
38. See Haxtun Steam-Heater Co. v. Gordon, 2 N.D. 246, 254, 50 N.W. 708,
710 (1891).
39. Green v. Williams, 92 Tenn. 220, 21 S.W. 520 (1893).'
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notice was given in some other manner does not excuse failure to
follow the statute.
40
There have been statutes giving a subsequent mechanics' lien pri-
ority over mortgages already existing at the time the mechanics' lien
fastened upon the property. Such statutory attempts to make the
subsequent mechanics' lien prior as to the property covered by the
mortgage already existing at the time the statute was enacted would
pretty clearly be unconstitutional, as an impairment of the mortgagee's
contract.41 It is different, however, as to mortgages made subsequently.
Then the mortgagee has notice that such a thing is within the pos-
sibilities; every mortgage contract is presumed to be executed with
reference to existing laws, and subject to such modifications.
42
Tennessee has a statute that takes a half-way step in this direction.
Her statute provides that if the lienor gives ten days' notice to the
holder of a mortgage in existence prior to the commencement of
operations, the lien shall have priority over the mortgage if the mort-
gagee consents, and upon failure of the mortgagee to object in writing
within ten days after the receipt of the notice, his consent shall be
implied.43 The same rule operates upon the vendor's lien when he has
conveyed, expressly reserving a lien, or has only executed a title
bond.
44
So much for an introductory discussion; now let us direct our at-
tention to Southern Blow Pipe & Roofing Co. v. Grubb,45 which is one
of the principal cases to be discussed. There the controversies con-
cerned the holder of a deed of trust, who loaned money to the owner
of property for the construction of an apartment house, on the one
hand, and three materialmen-lienors who furnished material for the
apartment house-on the other hand. Athens Federal Savings & Loan
Association loaned money to the owner, Grubbs, on three separate
occasions for the construction of the apartment house. The first loan
was made September 2, 1947; a second loan was made January 21,
1948; and a third on May 28, 1948. Each loan was secured by a deed
of trust, which was properly recorded on the date the loan was made.
On December 1, 1947 the owner signed a contract with one of the
materialmen's lienors, Southern Blow Pipe and Roofing Company by
which the lienor agreed to furnish for the building the necessary work,
40. McDonnell v. Amo, 162 Tenn. 36, 34 S.W.2d 212 (1931); Henderson v.
Watson, 25 Tenn. App. 506, 160 S.W.2d 429 (E.S. 1941).
41. Central Savings Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151
(1939).
42. 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 354 (1943); cf. Green v. Williams, 92 Tenn. 220,
21 S.W. 520 (1893).
43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7924 (Williams 1934). Where mortgagee saw the
written contract between materialman and owner, he had the requisite written
notice. Neely v. Saunders Co., 169 Tenm. 30, 81 S.W.2d 390 (1935).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7924 (Williams 1934).
45. 260 S.W.2d 191 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
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labor and materials for the erection or installation of stucco. This
job took about two weeks and was completed sometime between
January 15 and March 15, 1948. On August 23, 1948 Roofing Company
recorded their lien, and the building was not completed until more
than a year later, or December, 1949.
A second materialmen's lien, the McKenzie claim, was for materials
purchased by the owner under contract delivered between March 10
and May 27, 1948. This lien was recorded on August 25, 1948.
The third materialman claiming a lien is McLendon, who furnished
materials to the owner during February and March, 1948. This lien
was not recorded.
Roofing Company's Claim: As to the Roofing Company's claim, the
court held that it should be subordinated to all of the Loan Company's
deeds of trust, since the recording of Roofing's claim was more than 90
days after the completion of its contract and not within 90 days after
the building was completed. It is clear that Roofing recorded its lien
long before the building was completed, but more than 90 days after
it furnished the material.
The statute provides two different filing periods in order for the
lien to be valid against subsequent encumbrancers. The lien must be
filed within 90 days after the building is completed, or within 90 days
after the contract of the lienor is terminated.46 The Tennessee pro-
visions relating to materialmen are construed by the Tennessee court
to be mandatory, and a lien filed after the period allowed by the
statute is void.47 Thus the court concluded that the statutory require-
ments for recording were not satisfied.
The court concluded that recording by the lienor more than 90 days
after furnishing the labor and materials, but before completion of
the building, is not a proper recording within the purview of either of
the two specified periods designated by the statute. Prior Tennessee
cases support the court in the instant case in its conclusion that a
recordation before the work is completed does not satisfy the require-
ment that the recordation must be within 90 days after the work is
completed.48 The recordation is said to be premature. So the Gfubb
case is in line with Tennessee authority in what the writer thinks is
a mechanical, literal and unrealistic interpretation of the statute.
Taking what the writer believes to be a realistic, pragmatic approach
to the matter, if a lien is recorded before the work is completed and
remains of record after it is completed, is not the lien recorded within
90 days after the work is completed? Giving a reasonable interpreta-
46. TENN. CODE A N. § 7919 (Williams 1934).
47. McDonnell v. Amo, 162 Tenn. 36, 34 S.W.2d 212 (1931); Brown v. Brown
& Co., 25 Tenn. App. 509, 160 S.W.2d 431 (E.S. 1941).
48. Bird Brothers v. Southern Surety Co., 139 Tenn. 11, 200 S.W. 978 (1917);
Oliver King Sand & Lime Co. v. Sterchi, 7 Tenn. App. 647 (E.S. 1928).
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tion to this phrase of the statute, does not the requirement that the
lien must be recorded within 90 days after the building is completed
simply place a maximum date beyond which a lien cannot be filed
and be valid as against encumbrancers? If that is a correct interpreta-
tion of the statute, then Roofing did file its lien within the time re-
quired by the statute. The chancellor who tried the case in the lower
court had so held.
Moreover, the view that a lien filed before the work is completed,
and which remains of record after it is completed, is much fairer to the
third party prospective creditors, whom the statute is designed to
protect, than the view which says that it is not a proper recordation.
To go back a little, the Tennessee court holds that a mechanics' lien
properly recorded within 90 days after the completion of the building
relates back to the date of visible commencement of operations and
thus takes priority over encumbrancers and other creditors who be-
came such in the interim between the date of visible commencement
of operations and the date the lien is recorded.49 Thus a lien recorded
on the 90th day after the building is completed takes priority over a
recorded mortgage or deed of trust that was executed between the time
the building was started and ninety days after its completion. Now
if the lien is recorded before the building is completed, then it gives
notice to prospective creditors for a much longer time than if it is
recorded sometime within the 90 days after the building is completed.
Thus it is much fairer to those creditors.
There seems to be a somewhat incongruous lesson to be learned
from the view of the Tennessee court on this point. Materialmen and
laborers must be careful not to give other and prospective creditors
too much notice by way of recordation, else the materialmen and
laborers will forfeit their liens. That is to say, if they do not file their
liens within 90 days after they have furnished the material, they must
wait until after the building is completed. To say the least, that seems
a bit strange to the writer.
McKenzie Claim: The McKenzie claim was for materials delivered
between March 10th and May 27th. The lien was recorded on August
25th, or on the 90th day after the delivery of the last materials. This
lien was held to be superior to the deeds of trust of Association re-
corded January 21, 1948 and May 28, 1948. The McKenzie lien was
recorded on the 90th day, which was held to be within 90 days after
the commencement of operations. Since, by virtue of the statute, the
lien would "relate to and take effect from the time of the visible com-
mencement of operations, ' 0 the court held that the lien fastened to
the property as of December 1, 1947. Thus, the court concluded that it
49. See note 36 supra.
50. TENN. CODE AxN. § 7915 (Williams 1934).
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took priority over Association's deeds of trust which were recorded
January 21 and May 28, 1948.
There is one feature here that causes the writer some concern.
McKenzie never began to deliver materials until March 10th, 1948, yet
the court relates the McKenzie lien back to and makes it take effect as
of December 1, 1947, the date when the owner of the building started
operations. The court thus reached the anomalous decision of giving
McKenzie a lien that took effect more than three months before Mc-
Kenzie ever furnished any materials.
Moreover, this conclusion seems to be unduly prejudicial to the
rights of the innocent parties without knowledge (Association with
their deeds of trust). There simply is no way in which Association
could have protected itself against such a situation. Here a material-
man (McKenzie) who has furnished materials between March 10th
and May 27th after the execution and recordation of one of Associa-
tion's deeds of trust (January 21st) is given priority over the deed of
trust. Such a construction of the mechanics' lien statute creates a
snare to subsequent innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, against
which there is no protection. That doctrine will discourage financing
of building and construction. What lender will be willing to lay out his
money if he knows there is no possible way to protect himself against
future liens of potential furnishers, who aren't even in the picture
when the loan is made?
Does the Tennessee statute compel any such harsh conclusion? It
provides that the lien, if recorded within 90 days after the completion
of the contract, shall "relate to and take effect from the time of the
visible commencement of operations." What is the "visible commence-
ment of operations" of which the statute speaks? Is it the beginning
of the building in which McKenzie (mechanics' lienor) had no part
whatsoever, since his claim springs from a separate and independent
contract with the owner made more than three months after the
building was started by the owner, or does "visible commencement of
operations" mean McKenzie's (mechanics' lienor) visible commence-
ment of operations? The writer is of the persuasion that it means the
visible commencement of operations of the lienor-the time when the
lienor furnished his material.
The writer has found one other case which is closely relevant and
it reaches a different result from the Tennessee decision. In Welch v.
Porter & Co., 51 the facts were nearly on all fours with the case at hand.
The owner made a contract with a builder. Another person (Porter
& Co.) contracted with the owner under a separate and independent
contract to furnish some materials for the job. But before Porter &
Co. had made a contract and before they had furnished any materials,
51. 63 Ala. 225 (1879).
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Welch lent the owner money and took a mortgage on the premises.
The Alabama statute provided that the materialman's lien "shall
attach, and be preferred to all other incumbrances which may be at-
tached to or upon such buildings ... subsequent to the commencement
of such buildings or improvements." Observe that the Alabama statute
provides that the mechanics' lien shall attach at the "commencement of
such buildings or improvements,"-much the same as the Tennessee
statute ("visible commencement of operations"). The Alabama statute,
like the Tennessee statute, requires that the lien be recorded within a
fixed period after the indebtedness had accrued. Under these recording
statutes the Alabama court held that since each lienor had contracted
independently with the owner, each lien dated from the commence-
ment of work or furnishing of materials of the particular contractor.
Consequently the Welch mortgage was given priority over the me-
chanics' lien of Porter & Co. By that analogy, McKenzie's lien would
have attached from the date of the commencement of work or fur-
nishing of materials by McKenzie, and not from the date when the
building was started by the owner, which was more than three months
before McKenzie had made his contract or furnished any material. In
short, the writer believes that "visible commencement of operations"
under the Tennessee statute should refer to the visible commencement
of operations by the particular independent contractor (McKenzie).
The Alabama court has some language that seems quite pertinent
here. The court says:
"If we were to hold that, because a building had been commenced,
a subsequent contractor or material-man could' acquire a lien, which
would take precedence over an intervening incumbrance, we think we
would shock the moral sense of the profession, and fail to carry out the
intention of the legislature. Let us show, by an illustration, to what con-
sequences such a doctrine would lead. A mechanic commences a building,
but, for some cause, fails to complete it. He has forfeited his claim for
compensation, or has been paid, and has no claim which can support a
lien. An incumbrance is then created on the property, by mortgage or
otherwise. Subsequent to the creation of this incumbrance, another
mechanic is employed to complete the work and finish the building. Will
his lien date back to the commencement of the building by his predecessor,
and thus be preferred to that of the intervening incumbrancer? We sup-
pose no one would contend for such a result as this, and yet we can per-
ceive no difference, in principle, between the claim of such subsequent
contractor, and that of a material-man who furnishes materials under a
contract made after the creating of the incumbrance. ' '52
In the case at hand, the Tennessee court relies on Brown v. Brown
& Co.,5 3 to support their conclusion that the McKenzie mechanics' lien
takes priority over the deed of trust, by relating it back to December
52. 63 Ala. 225, 232 (1879).
53. 25 Tenn. App. 509, 160 S.W.2d 431 (E.S. 1941).
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1, 1947, as the date of the visible commencement of operations, as con-
templated by the statute. That case does not quite stand for that
proposition, however. In truth, in the Brown case the claim of the
mortgagee was given priority over the mechanics' lien, for the reason
that the mechanics' lien had not been recorded in time. While the
Brown case is not clear on the point, it also appears that the lien claim-
ant there was the original contractor who had done all the work from
the start of the building. A prospective mortgagee would have been
put on notice that a lien might attach for these improvements. Con-
sequently, Brown dicta needs to be read in light of that fact. For had
the Brown lien claimant recorded his lien within the proper time, his
claim no doubt would have related back to the beginning of visible
operations. But in the case at hand, the lien claimant (McKenzie)
never came into the picture until more than three months after the
building was started, and not until after Association had loaned the
money and recorded one deed of trust.
In support of the court's opinion is the idea that the materialman
has increased the value of the Association's security, theoretically at
least to the value of the lien. The court makes no mention of any
such argument, however.
McLendon Claim: McLendon furnished materials to the owner dur-
ing February and March, 1948, but this lien never was recorded. The
court quite properly held that the McLendon lien took priority over
the Association's deed of trust dated May 28, 1948. McLendon was
furnishing material to the owner before the money secured by this
deed of trust was loaned to Owner. McLendon refused to give Owner
further credit and Association, knowing that McLendon was furnish-
ing material and was threatening to quit, assured McLendon that the
materials, if delivered, would be paid by the Association. The As-
sociation expressly told McLendon that it was going to make the
owner another loan out of which all bills for labor and materials would
be paid. Subsequently McLendon delivered materials to the owner but
they were not paid for when the loan secured by the deed of trust
dated May 28 was made.
Although McLendon did not record his lien, this did not destroy it
as to Association, for the reason that a recordation is necessary only
as against a subsequent encumbrancer without notice. Association
knew all about McLendon's claim when it advanced the money to
Owner. Thus McLendon had a lien against the owner for one year;
and as to the owner, recordation is not necessary in order to preserve
the lien.5 4
Taking the decisi6n in its broadest aspects, it can be based on estop-
54. TENN. CODE AxN. § 7919 (Williams 1934).
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pel, although the court does not so label it. In short, the Association
estopped itself to assert its priority.55
The other recent case in the field of priorities between deeds of trust
and mechanics' liens is First State Bank v. Stacey.0 There Stacey
undertook to build a dwelling house. While the house was still under
construction, he made a deed of trust to secure a note to the First
State Bank in the sum of $10,000. The trust deed Was recorded July 1,
1950. Stacey was unable to complete the house as planned and First
State Bank foreclosed its deed of trust and the house and lot were
sold at public auction for $9,750.
However, during the construction of the building, and before the
trust deed was foreclosed, certain furnishers had furnished labor and
materials for which they claim mechanics' lien priorities in the pro-
ceeds from the foreclosure sale over the deed of trust. These two
claimants of liens were Turner and Moore-Handley Hardware Com-
pany.
The Turner Claim: Turner contracted with Stacey to furnish the
fixtures and wire the house for electricity. Turner began this work
in April, 1950 and completed substantially all of it by June 10, 1950.
On November 20, 1950 he recorded his lien in the register's office. The
court held the deed of trust superior to the Turner claim. It was clear
that Turner did not file his claim within 90 days after he had com-
pleted his contract, which is the first of two alternative times for filing
a lien. The statute57 fixes two alternative periods for filing: (1) within
ninety days after the building is demolished, altered, or completed;
or (2) within ninety days after the claimant's contract expires or is
terminated or he is discharged. Since Turner did not file within the
time allowed within the second alternative time for filing (within 90
days after his contract expired or was terminated), there remained
the question of dealing with the first alternative time (within 90 days
after the building is completed). Turner's position was that since the
house was never finished, the time had not arrived when he was re-
qfiired to file his claim for a hen under this first alternative. The court
held against Turner on that point and decided that where the building
is not completed, the lien claimant must file his claim within 90 days
after his contract is terminated (the second alternative time for filing).
This seems to be the first time this point has been squarely before
55. Ash v. Honig, 62 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 614 (1933).
There the mortgagee held off recording his mortgage, assuring contractor that
the property was clear and that he (mortgagee) would finance construction,
whereupon contractor started work. Then mortgage was recorded before
notice of lien was filed. The court permitted the contractor to assert priority.
For a discussion of some defenses to actions under the Tennessee mechanics'
lien statutes, see Anderson, Defenses to Actions under Mechanics' Lien Statute,
17 TExN. L. REv. 460 (1942).
56. 261 S.W.2d 245 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7919 (Williams 1934).
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the court. The decision makes it a bit hard on the contractor who in-
tends to file his claim after the building is completed for if the owner
is sufficiently unfortunate financially so that he cannot complete the
building, then the contractor has taken a risk that has caused him a
distinct loss. This, case thus makes it plain that the materialman or
laborer had better file his claim at the earliest possible date for filing
and not dilly-dally, else he may lose his lien. But then it does not im-
pose any great burden on the materialman to require him to be dili-
gent.
The Moore-Handley Hardware Company Claim: There claimant
made an oral contract with Stacey in April, 1950 to furnish materials
as were required. All the items for which a lien was claimed were
furnished between June 1, 1950 and July 17, 1950 except one fixture
which was furnished August 10, 1950. Claimant filed his lien in the
register's office on January 24, 1951. This clearly was more than ninety
days after the delivery of the last item for which a lien was claimed.
The court held that the deed of trust took priority over the Moore-
Handley claim on the ground that this claim for a lien priority was
not filed within the time provided by the statute. It was not filed
within ninety days after the completion or termination of claimant's
contract.
The comments on the Turner claim regarding the time when a lien
must be filed when a building is not finished are pertinent here.
PRSONAL PRoPERTY EXEMPTiON STATUTES
The case of Keen v. Alexander5s deals with the steps that must be
taken in order for a debtor to secure the protection of the chattel
exemption statute.
By way of introduction, perhaps it may be well to point out that
the subject of exemptions from claims of creditors is important when
a trustee in bankruptcy as a representative of creditors is seeking to
collect assets to pay off creditors; and the subject is of equal im-
portance where a single creditor, not in a bankruptcy proceeding, is
seeking to satisfy his claim out of the assets of his debtor. Whatever
is property in the hands of the debtor is available to his creditors,
unless it is exempt by law.59 In so far as exemptions from claims of
creditors are concerned, exemptions given the debtor from the claims
of the single creditor by the relevant state law are respected by the
National Bankruptcy Act. The Bankruptcy Act expressly recognizes
the exemptions granted by the states,60
58. 195 Tenn. 564, 260 S.W.2d 297 (1953).
59. "Every debtor's property, except such as may be specially exempt by
law is assets for the satisfaction of all his just debts." TENN. CODE Axx. § 8197
(Williams 1934).
60. § 6 of Bankruptcy Act, 59 STAT. 847 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Supp.
1953).
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The munificent social policy of shielding a debtor and his family
from want has grown as a part of our American heritage. The ex-
emption statutes are manifold. They range from the early statutes
exempting only personal property such as wearing apparel and the
instruments or books necessary to the debtor's avocation to the present
day legislation which insulates from claims of creditors all sorts of
chattels,61 a piece of land as a "homestead," 2 additional widow's
support,63 wages, 4 or allows the debtor to create an estate for his
family by means of insurance. 5
Section 7701 of the Tennessee Code60 expressly names a great num-
ber of specific chattels that are exempt from execution, seizure or
attachment in the hands or possession of heads of families, who are
bona fide citizens and permanently residing in Tennessee. Then the
last paragraph of that code section provides that if "the head of the
family does not own sufficient articles" that are specifically exempt
by the code section to total $450, then "such head of the family may
select additional articles" owned by him to an amount sufficient to total
$450. Keen v. Alexander gives the lawyer some guidance as to steps
that must be taken in Tennessee in order to bring within the protective
pale of this chattel exemption statute those chattels that may be
selected by reason of the statute as exempt articles, but which are not
expressly made exempt from execution by the statute.
In the Keen case the sheriff levied on an automobile (which the
statute does not expressly exempt). Keen, the debtor, claimed that
the fair market value of this automobile, together with the value of
all specifically exempt personalty owned by him, did not exceed the
sum of $450.00. Therefore, Keen took the position that this automobile
was exempt from execution. After the automobile had been seized,
Keen executed and filed a supersedeas bond and the sheriff returned
the automobile to Keen. Subsequently the trial court directed Keen
to return the automobile to the sheriff or a judgment would be entered
against Keen and his bondsman.
Keen went to the Tennessee Supreme Court on a petition for cer-
tiorari alleging a wrongful levy on exempt property. The Supreme
Court denied Keen relief on the grounds that his petition for cer-
tiorari did not allege that he had informed the levying officer of his
election to claim the automobile as exempt property so as to bring his
aggregate exemption up to $450 allowed by the statute and did not
61. For a lengthy list of chattel exemptions in Tennessee, see TENN. CODE
ANx. §§ 7707, 7709, 7710, 7712, 7715-7718 (Williams 1934); Id. §§ 7701-01.2,
7708, 7711, 7713, 7714, 7714.2-14.7, 7718.1-18.5 (Supp. 1952).
62. TENN. CODE ANN. §9 7719-7734 (Williams 1934). Id. § 7719 (Supp. 1952).
63. TENr. CODE ANN. §§ 8231-8232 (Williams 1934).
64. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7711-7712 (Williams 1934).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8456, 8458, 6398 (Williams 1934). Id. §§ 7718.1-18.5
(Supp. 1952).
66. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7701 (Williams Supp. 1952).
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allege that Keen, the debtor, was head of a family. This Tennessee
chattel exemption is limited to the head of the family by the express
language of the statute, and the case law makes it clear that the bur-
den of proof is upon the one who claims the exemption provided by
the statute to prove that he is the head of the family.67 The debtor's
petition did not allege that he was the head of a family.
Where a levy is made on property expressly exempted by the statute,
such levy is an abuse of process and will be quashed on a petition for
certiorari.0 8 However, an automobile is not an article expressly ex-
empted by statute from levy. The statute provides that the debtor
"may select additional articles" in the aggregate of $450.00. The
debtor's petition for certiorari was silent as to whether he had se-
lected the automobile as exempt property or sought to regain it prior
to the filing of his petition for certiorari. Also, the debtor claiming
the exemption has the burden of proving that the value of his remain-
ing personalty, in addition to the property expressly exempt, does
not exceed $450.9 Therefore, the court seems properly to have con-
cluded that the levy on the automobile was not an abuse of process
in the absence of a showing by the debtor (Keen) that he had elected
to claim the automobile as exempt and that the sheriff then arbitrarily
refused to surrender it as exempt property.
The Tennessee court draws a fine line with respect to the power of
a debtor, who has an exemption, to free the property from the ex-
emption. On the one hand, the court holds that the head of a family
may not waive such express exemptions as the homestead exemption,
specific chattel exemptions and an additional year's support for the
widow.7 0 Such restriction is construed not as a restriction on the
absolute ownership of the head of the family, but as a restraint placed
by the statute upon creditors seeking to collect their debts.7 1 Upon
that reasoning the court will not permit the head of a family to waive
those express exemptions. On the other hand, the debtor has the ab-
solute right to sell or mortgage property expressly exempt from exe-
cution, and such sale or mortgage will be enforced, although the prop-
erty cannot be legally levied on and sold under execution even by
67. Forehand v. Forehand, 28 Tenn. App. 131, 187 S.W.2d 635 (M.S. 1945).
68. Jones v. Williams, 32 Tenn. 105 (85).
69. Forehand v. Forehand, 28 Tenn. App. 131, 187 S.W.2d 635 (M.S. 1945).
70. McAdams v. McAdams, 177 Tenn. 67, 146 S.W.2d 140 (1941). See Ameri-
can Trust & Banking Co. v. Twinam, 187 Tenn. 570, 576, 216 S.W.2d 314, 317
(1948); Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn. 554, 555, 188 S.W.2d
345-46 (1944). However, insurance that is given a statutory exemption from
claims of creditors can be freed from the exemption by the insured if he
clearly so indicates. Lunsford v. Nashville Savings & Loan Corp., 162 Tenn.
179, 35 S.W.2d 395 (1931); see Adams v. Garraway, 179 Tenn. 93, 96, 162
S.W.2d 1086, 1087 (1942).
71. See Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn. 554, 555-56, 188
S.W.2d 345, 346 (1944).
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consent.7 2 Here the court feels that it is sound public policy to provide
that the thrifty and responsible head of a family should have the right
to sell or borrow, in an emergency, in order to raise funds for the
support of his family.73 The court does not reckon with the possibility
that the debtor might be a wastrel and squander the funds raised by
waiving the exemption through mortgage or sale, rather than use the
funds for the support of the family.
MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE REGISTRATION LAW
The Tennessee Supreme Court, had a second look at the rather in-
volved Tennessee Motor Vehicle Title and Registration Law, which
was enacted by the 1951 Legislature.1 4 The case before the court was
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Ware,75 and it dealt with the question
whether a lien had to be recorded upon the application for the certifi-
cate of title in order to be constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.
This Title Registration Law requires owners of motor vehicles to
register them in the name of the owner with the Motor Vehicle
Division of the Tennessee Department of Safety and the owner must
procure from it a certificate of title and a title card. An application
for a certificate of title is made and later (often months) a title cer-
tificate is issued and delivered to the owner if there is no lien or en-
cumbrance appearing thereon. Otherwise, it is delivered to the per-
son holding the first lien shown on the certificate, and it is, held by
such person until the lien is discharged.76
Section 68 of the Act provides:
"No conditional sales contract, chattel mortgage, or other lien or en-
cumbrance or title retention instrument upon a registered vehicle, other
than a lien dependent upon possession entered into after the effective
date of this act shall be valid against the creditors of an owner or sub-
sequent purchasers or encumbrances [sic] until the requirements of this
article have been complied with, unless such creditor, purchaser, or
encumbrancer has actual knowledge of the prior lien." 77
72. Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn. 554, 188 S.W.2d 345 (1944)
cf. American Trust & Banking Co. v. Twinam, 187 Tenn. 570, 216 S.W.2d 314
(1948) (creditor prevailed as to exempt insurance assigned to him).
73. See Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn. 554, 557, 188 S.W,2d
345 (1944).
74. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 5538.101-5538.197 (Williams Supp. 1952). The court
had its first look at this statute in City Finance Co. v. Perry, 195 Tenn. 81, 257
S.W.2d 1 (1953), which was the subject of a comment in the 1953 Tennessee
Survey, 7 VAND. L. REv. 1049 (1953). In the Perry case the court was con-
cerned with priorities between lien claimants as affected by the Title Regis-
tration Law. The Perry case is also the subject of a comment in 23 TENN. L.
REV. 238 (1954).
75. 195 Tenn- 423, 260 S.W.2d 162 (1953). This case also is noted briefly in
23 TENN. L. REv. 238, 242 (1954).
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 5538.135 (d) (Williams Supp. 1952).
77. Id. at § 5538.168.
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Section 69 (a) of the Act provides:
"Such filing and the notation of the lien or encumbrance upon the cer-
tificate of title as provided in this act shall constitute constructive notice
of all liens and encumbrances against the vehicle- described therein to
creditors of the owner, to subsequent purchasers and encumbrances [sic]
except such liens as may be authorized by law dependent upon pos-
session." 78
Section 69 (a) further provides that constructive notice of a lien shall
date from the "receipt and filing of the request for the notation of said
lien or encumbrance upon the certificate of title by the division as
shown by the endorsement thereon."79
Section 69 (b) provides that this method of giving constructive notice
of a lien or encumbrance upon a motor vehicle shall be exclusive, ex-
cept as to liens dependent upon possession.80
In the Ware case the owner of an automobile went to the plaintiff
bank for a loan which was to be secured by a chattel mortgage on the
automobile. At that time his car was unencumbered with liens. Owner
showed his application for a title certificate and bill of sale to the
bank and obtained a loan, payable in installments. The loan was se-
cured by a chattel mortgage, executed in duplicate. Owner also exe-
cuted a notice of the bank's lien on a form prescribed by the Motor,
Vehicle Department. The bank forwarded one of the duplicate
originals of the chattel mortgage and the proof of lien to the Motor
Vehicle Department but made no notation of its lien on the applica-
tion for a title certificate. The application for a title certificate was
kept by the car owner. Some time later a certificate of title was issued
by the department to the owner of the encumbered automobile, with
the lien of the bank duly noted thereon. Pursuant to the statute, this
title certificate was mailed to the bank. Owner later defaulted in his
installment payments and bank elected to declare the entire balance
due as provided in the chattel mortgage. Later, and more than two
months after the bank had registered its lien with the department,
owner sold the automobile to defendants, apparently without notifying
the defendants of the bank's lien. The sale was without the bank's
knowledge. Defendants ostensibly relied on a copy of the bill of sale,
which owner had, showing the sale of the car to him, and also on the
application for the certificate of title which owner had in his pos-
session and which carried the statement that there were no liens on
the vehicle.
Plaintiff bank sued to replevy the automobile from the defendant
purchasers. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the bank's
mortgage was superior to the claim of the subsequent purchaser
78. Id. at § 5538.169(a).
79. Ibid.
80. Id. at § 5538.169(b).
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(defendant) and affirmed a judgment of the Court of Appeals in
favor of plaintiff bank.
The court starts with the basic premise that this Motor Vehicle
Title Registration Act undertakes to provide the exclusive method of
registration of chattel mortgages on automotive vehicles and the bank
had fully complied with the Act when it mailed its request for a lien
to the Department of Safety. The court then concludes that the bank
should prevail since there is nothing in the act that would require the
bank to make a notation of its lien on the owner's application for a
title certificate. The court was of the opinion that the application for
certificate of title simply gave the owner the permission to drive the
car temporarily, not exceeding 120 days until the department could
decide whether to issue the title certificate.
If the sale to the defendant was made before the certificate of title
was issued, then there is some difficulty with the court's conclusion
that the defendant-purchaser had constructive notice of the bank's
lien. The act is not completely clear as to when constructive notice
is effective. By the terms of the act constructive notice dates only from
the "receipt and filing of the request for the notation of the said lien
or encumbrance upon the certificate of title by the division as shown
by the endorsement thereon."8' Does that mean that constructive
notice dates from the filing of the request for a lien with the depart-
ment with the "endorsement thereon," even if no certificate of title
has been issued? Or does a certificate of title have to be in existence
with the "endorsement thereon" before the filing constitutes construc-
tive notice? If the latter interpretation is given to the act then there
simply was no certificate of title upon which the bank's lien could be
recorded so as to serve as constructive notice to the purchaser, if the
sale was made before the certificate of title was issued. The court, in
the case at hand, seems to equivocate somewhat on the question
whether a lien is constructive notice from the time the request is
received, and noted by the department. The court observes that "the
defendants made no effort to ascertain the existence of the lien of the
Plaintiff by making inquiry to the Department of Motor Vehicles in
Nashville." It thus seems to deny defendant's claim, in part at least,
on the ground that defendant had not been diligent in trying to find
out about plaintiff's lien. If the plaintiff's lien constituted constructive
notice to defendant from the time it was received and noted by the
department, then defendant's diligence or lack of diligence is im-
material; defendant would be chargeable with constructive notice
and that would end the matter. Neither does the case make it clear
whether the automobile was sold to the defendant after the title certi-
ficate was issued by the department or before the title certificate was
81. Id. at § 5538.169(a).
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issued. If the sale was made after the title was issued, then defendant
clearly would have had constructive notice. In light of these ambigui-
ties in the opinion the writer is not completely satisfied with the
court's conclusion that the bank fully complied with the recordation
features of the act so as to put the purchaser on constructive notice.
Also, what about estoppel? The trial court, which decided in favor
of the defendant purchaser, may have been of the opinion that the
bank should have made, or caused to be made, some notation on the
application for the certificate of title showing its lien on the vehicle
and not simply turn the application back to the owner unnoted. In
the case at bar the bank did not make a notation of its lien on the
application for a certificate of title, and apparently it caused no nota-
tion to be made on the copy of the application with the department,
although the application has spaces for making notation of liens and
the bank used the application as a basis for its loan. Instead, the bank
entrusted the unencumbered application to the car owner and thus
clothed him with the power to defraud the defendant purchaser who
relied on an application free from encumbrances, and who could not
check the title certificate for liens, if the certificate had not yet been
issued by the department. Under the circumstances the essential ele-
ments of an estoppel might be found to be present. There may have
been (1) conduct by the bank reasonably calculated to convey the
impression that the facts were otherwise than, and inconsistent with,
those which the bank afterwards attempted to assert; (2) conduct
which at least was calculated to induce a reasonably prudent person
to believe such conduct was intended or expected to be relied and
acted upon; (3) knowledge by the bank of the real facts; (4) plus an
innocent reliance by the purchaser to his prejudice . 2 Moreover, negli-
gent silence may work an estoppel as effectually as an express repre-
sentation, notwithstanding there was no intention to mislead.
8 3
The court decided that there was nothing in the act that.would re-
quire the bank to make a notation of its lien on the application, and
that the bank had fully complied with the act. That could all be true,
but that does not prevent the bank from being estopped to assert its
claim. Even if we indulge the somewhat questionable assumption
that the bank had recorded its lien so as to give purchaser constructive
notice, that still does not prevent the application of the doctrine of
estoppel against the bank. Even though a claimant of an interest in
property has complied with all applicable recording acts, he may still
82. These basic essentials of estoppel are uniformly recognized. Church of
Christ v. McDonald, 180 Tenn. 86, 171 S.W.2d 817 (1943); 3 POMERoy, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 805 (5th ed. 1941); 19 Am. JuR., Estoppel §§ 42, 46 (1939).




be deprived of his interest by estoppel.8 4 Compliance with the record-
ing statutes does not make a foolproof claim. Recording statutes
simply lay down a certain statutory requirement which must be com-
plied with. They do not close out other ways of losing one's claim.
5
In light of the fact that the court has now decided that the Motor
Vehicle Title Registration Act does not require the notation of a Hen
on an application for a certificate of title, when coupled with the fact
that the title certificate recordation is the exclusive method of record-
ing such liens, it might be well for the legislature to amend the act so
as to require some notation of a lien on the application. It would be
no great trouble for a creditor to note its lien on the application. As
the act now stands, as construed by the decision at hand, one creditor
can work an unnecessary hardship on a subsequent creditor or pur-
chaser before the title certificate is issued by the department (for at
least 120 days) by failing to note his lien on the application. Of course,
after the title certificate has been issued a prospective purchaser or
creditor is put on notice that there is the chance of a lien if the owner
cannot produce the title certificate, since the act provides that the
lienor shall hold the certificate until the lien is discharged. We know
that the act provides that the filing of a hen upon the certificate of
title shall date from the "receipt and filing of the request for the no-
tation of said lien or encumbrance upon the certificate of title."
8 0 That
clearly takes care of the situation where a certificate of title actually
has been issued. But the real "rub" comes during that often long
interim after the application for a certificate of title has been filed
and before the title certificate is issued.
Of course, if the court construes this act to mean that constructive
notice dates from the time the request for a lien reaches the depart-
ment and the request is noted, rather than when it actually is noted
on the certificate of title itself when issued, that would, in part, cure
the evil. During this interim before the certificate is issued a pros-
pective purchaser from, or a prospective creditor of, the owner of an
automobile should; however, be provided a place certain where he
could find out about liens, without unnecessary delay and red tape.
On the other hand, if the constructive notice dates only from the
date when the lien is noted on the certificate of title itself, which may
not be issued for months later, then there is a hole in the act which
needs to be plugged.
84. 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 810a (5th ed. 1941); 2 MERRILL,
NOTICE § 925 (1952).
85. 2 MERRILL, NOTICE § 925 (1952); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 810a
(5th ed. 1941). By analogy, the recordation of a fraudulent conveyance will
not make the transfer immune to attack as to creditors who became such even
after the recordation. 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
§ 343c (2d ed. 1940).
86. TENN. CODE ANN. § 5538.169 (a) (Williams Supp. 1952).
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BuLK SALEs STATUTE ,
In Bradas & Gheens, Inc. v. Brewer,7 The Tennessee Supremie Court
had a look at the question-of a purchaser's liability when the Bulk
Sales Law is not complied with. But first, a little background before
taking up the principal case may make the case more useful to the
reader.
In the classic case of a "sale in bulk" a merchant, instead of selling
his goods over the counter day by day-in the usual course of business
-disposes of the whole stock at one time and to one buyer. This in-
dicates, of course, that the merchant is tired of his business, but the
experience of the ages also recognized that often the transaction is a
harbinger of travel abroad-the proceeds of sale going with the voy-
aging merchant to parts unknown. s
As the years went on, the sale in bulk presented what might be
described as a standard method of defrauding creditors, and a method
which called for protection of a preventive nature. So the last decade
of the preceding century gave birth to a movement for a statute on the
subject.8 9 Early in the current century bulk sales laws swept across
the country.90 So rapidly did the movement spread that a bulk sales
law is now featured in the statutes of perhaps every state.9'
The bulk sales statutes give the creditors a chance to be heard before
such a transaction has become cold, and also they may protect an
honest buyer against belated attacks. Such statutes protect the seller's
creditors against a sale of the whole or the major portion of the
debtor's chattels by requiring the parties to prepare an inventory of
seller's property and also prepare a list of the seller's creditors, plus
requiring a notice to such creditors a few days before possession is
87. 195 Tenn. 139, 258 S.W.2d 734 (1953).
88. For the need for bulk sales legislation, see Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A
Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 72, 75-80 (1928), where
the author describes outrageous situations involving the transfer by tradesmen
of their stock in gross, without making provision for their creditors.
89. Id. at 81-85.
90. Id. at 85-86.
91. See Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Meaning to be Attached to the Quantitative
and Qualitative Requirements Phrases of the Statutes, [1954] WASHI. U.L.Q.
282. See also Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77
U. OF PA. L. REV. 72 (1928); Note, 168 A.L.R. 735-88 (exhaustive annotations on
the businesses or sellers subject to bulk sales statutes, as well as the types of
property subject to these statutes). At first there was some question as to the
constitutionality of the Bulk Sales Law. The New York Law of 1902 was held
unconstitutional as denying merchants the equal protection of the laws as
against other classes of persons. Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 75 N.E. 404
(1905). However, Wright v. Hart was later overruled and the law sustained
in Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916). Such laws have been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court over objections on federal con-
stitutional grounds. Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489, 29 Sup. Ct. 174, 53 L. Ed.
295 (1909). Over various grounds of objection, Tennessee has declared her
bulk sales statute constitutional. Cantrell v. Ring, 125 Tenn. 472, 145 S.W. 166
(1911); State v. Ausmus Mill Co.; 123 Tenn. 399, 131 S.W. 867 (1910); Neas v.
Borches, 109 Tenn. 398, 71 S.W 50 (1902).
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taken under such a sale. The principal object is publicity in advance
of saleY
2
The statute may regulate (1) a sale "in bulk," and/or (2) a sale of
certain portions of the included property of the business; or it may also
regulate (3) any sale out of the ordinary course of trade.
0 3 The Ten-
nessee bulk sales statute condemns either a sale in bulk or a sale out of
the ordinary course of trade, unless the requirements of the statute
are met.94
The idea of these statutes is that the sale shall not be complete until
the statutory conditions are fulfilled. Within the time specified in the
statute the seller's creditor must act, if the case is such as to justify
action on his part. If the seller's purpose is fraudulent, now is the time
to give the purchaser notice, so that he will not have so changed his
position as to afford him a defense. At the expiration of the time
specified in the statute, the purchaser is safe, unless meanwhile a
creditor has attacked. Of course, if the parties have not complied
with the essential provisions of the bulk sales statute, the creditor may
either go after the property itself, or in some instances he has redress
against the purchaser himself5
If a fraudulent merchant will raise cash from his business and then
elope to parts unknown, it is by no means unlikely that the rascality
may take the form of a loan rather than an outright sale. Thus, to
give fuller protection to the seller's creditors, a bulk sales law should
provide that a bulk chattel mortgage should be treated the same as
a bulk sale. Some states do have statutes that cover the chattel mort-
gage by express language.0 6 More often, however, the legislature has
not mentioned chattel mortgages specifically in the bulk sales law,
but has left the answer to the courts. The Tennessee statute does not
expressly cover chattel mortgagesY7 By numerical weight of author-
ity, unless specifically provided, a bulk sales law does not cover a
92. See Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 72, 102 (1928).
93. For an exhaustive collection of these statutes and an analysis of the
various types, see Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Meaning to be Attached to the
Quantitative and Qualitative Requirements Phrases of the Statutes, [1954]
WASH. U. L. Q. 282.
94. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams 1934).
95. As to remedies of the creditor in general, see Colonial Milling Co. v.
Holt Bros., 3 Tenn. App. 617 (M.S. 1927); Daly v. Drug Co., 127 Tenn. 412, 155
S.W. 167 (1912); 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances §§ 487-493 (1943). A
purchaser of goods in violation of the Bulk Sales Act subjects himself to per-
sonal liability for the value of the goods, if sold or disposed of by him or com-
mingled with his own goods. Slaughter v. Cooper Corp., 20 Tenn. App. 241, 97
S.W.2d 648 (E.S. 1936).
96. See Billig and Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: Transactions Covered by these
Statutes, 39 W. VA. L. Q. 323, 326-27 (1933).
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams 1934).
[ VOL. 7
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
bulk chattel mortgage on a stock of goods9 s There is some authority
to the contrary, however 9
The Bulk Sales Acts are applicable only to sales by the owner and
are not applicable to court decrees and bona fide court sales1 00 There
is also considerable doubt that an auction sale falls within the pur-
view of the Bulk Sales Act.' 0 ' A trustee in bankruptcy of a seller
can avail himself of the benefits of the Bulk Sales Act for the benefit
of seller's creditors where a sale has been made in disregard of the
statute.
10 2
The Tennessee statute governing the "Sales of Stocks of Merchandise
in Bulk" provides:
"A sale of any portion of a stock of merchandise otherwise than in
the ordinary course of trade in the regular and usual prosecution of the
seller's business, or a sale of an entire stock of merchandise in bulk, shall
be presumed to be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the
seller, unless the seller and purchaser shall, at least five days before the
sale, make a full detailed inventory, showing the quantity, and, so far as
possible, with the exercise of a reasonable diligence, the cost price to the
seller of each article to be included in the sale; and unless such purchaser
shall, at least five days before the sale, in good faith, make full and
explicit inquiry of the seller as to the names and places of residence or
place of business of each and all of the creditors of the seller, and unless
the purchaser shall, at least five days before the sale, in good faith, notify
or cause to be notified, personally or by registered mail, each of the credi-
tors of the seller of whom the purchaser has knowledge, or can, with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, acquire knowledge, of the purposed sale
and of the cost price of the merchandise to be sold, and the price proposed
to be paid therefor by the purchaser; and the seller shall, at least five
days before such sale, fully and truthfully answer in writing each and all
of said inquiries; provided, however, no suit shall be brought or main-
tained by any creditor against such seller or purchaser within five days after
he received notice from any source of the intended sale and purchase,
98. See Billig and Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: Transactions Covered by these
Statutes, 39 W. VA. L. Q. 323, 327 (1933).
99. Id. at 327-28.
100. Schultz, Baujan & Co. v. Bell, 23 Tenn. App. 258, 130 S.W.2d 149 (M.S.
1938); Cooley v. Brennan, 102 Cal. App. 2d 952, 228 P.2d 104 (1951). Both
cases held the statute not applicable to a transfer of property under a divorce
decree.
101. For authority that auction sales do not fall within the interdiction of
the bulk sales statutes, see Lowe v. Fairberg, 245 App. Div. 731, 280 N.Y.
Supp. 615 (2d Dept. 1935). See also Goetz v. Michael Tauber & Co., 282 Fed.
869 (7th Cir. 1922).
102. Under § 70e of the present Bankruptcy Act, the trustee is entitled to
avoid any transaction which a creditor could have avoided under state law,
and concurrent jurisdiction is conferred for that purpose upon state and
Bankruptcy Courts. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (1953). Applied in Keller v. Fowler
Bros. & Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, 256 S.W. 879 (1923). Moreover, the recovery by a
trustee in bankruptcy, though based on the rights of certain creditors only,
inures to the benefit of all creditors. Creditors who could not have attacked
the transaction thus get a "windfall." Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 52 Sup. Ct. 3,
76 L. Ed. 133 (1931).
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and any suit- so brought shall be dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff in
the case."' 03
The next succeeding section of the Code provides that there shall
be a conclusive presumption that notice sent by registered mail was
received.10 4 Under the Tennessee statute actual fraud is not necessary
in order for sellor's creditors to have redress. A sale in violation of
the statute is not void because of a fraudulent intent and purpose,
but because declared so by statute, and so insolvency of the seller
is immaterial.10 5
Under the Tennessee statute there are four steps to be taken by
the parties in order to comply with the statute. They are: (1) making
a full detailed inventory of stock five days before the sale; (2) full and
explicit inquiry by the purchaser as to the names, residences, etc. of
all the creditors of seller five days before the sale; (3) notice five
days before the proposed sale, etc. by the purchaser to each creditor
of whom he has knowledge or as to whom he may with the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence acquire knowledge; and (4) the "seller
shall, at least five days before such sale, fully and truthfully answer
in writing each and all of said inquiries."
In Bradas & Gheens, Inc. v. Brewer,06 the pivotal point concerned
the failure of the seller to furnish to the purchaser the name of one
of seller's creditors. The plaintiff, Bradas & Gheens, Inc. a creditor
of a merchant who sold his goods in bulk to the defendent, Brewer,
sued to recover from defendent-buyer because of the omission of
plaintiff-creditor's name from the list of creditors furnished to buyer.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee found that there was a complete
compliance with the other requirements of the Bulk Sales Law. The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the plaintiff-
creditor was not entitled to recover from defendent-buyer, although
there was an omission of creditor's name from the list furnished by
seller. The court took the position that it was not the legislative
intent that the sale should be considered fraudulent as an unpaid
creditor merely because the name of such creditor was omitted by
the seller from the list furnished the buyer.
In the Bradas opinion the court thought it significant that the statute
provides that the sale shall be deemed fraudulent and void as to
creditors unless (the word used by the statute) there is compliance
with each of the first three requirements mentioned; but the word
"unless," or its equivalent in meaning, is omitted in the statute pro-
103. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams 1934).
104. TENN. CODE Aim. § 7284 (Williams 1934).
105. Slaughter v. Cooper Corp., 20 Tenn. App. 241, 97 S.W.2d 648 (E.S. 1936).
106. 195 Tenn. 139, 258 S.W.2d 734 (1953).
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viding for the fourth (not complied with) requirement, which is that
the seller fully and truthfully answer the inquiry as to the names,
residences, etc. of creditors. Since the word "unless" expressly pre-
cedes each of the first three requirements so as to make the sale
fraudulent in the absence of compliance with those requirements, the
court concluded that the word "unless" was omitted with reference to
the fourth requirement because it was not the legislative intent that
the sale be considered fraudulent as to an unpaid creditor merely be-
cause the name of such creditor was omitted by the seller from the
list furnished the buyer. Moreover, the court felt that the Bulk Sales
Act is a statute in derogation of the common law and must be strictly
construed.0
7
As Tennessee's highest tribunal points out, its decision in the case
at bar probably is sustained by the numerical weight of authority.08
Also, there is, as the court concludes, a rather pragmatic argument
in support of its view in that, if the failure to include a creditor on the
list would make the sale void, "no one would ever buy a stock of goods"
(which, of course, is an overstatement).
There is one facet of the decision which gives the writer some
difficulty, however. Just what is the significance of the failure to in-
clude all the creditors on the list? Is that requirement of the statute
meaningless? Speaking of legislative intent, as did the court, did not
the legislature intend that this requirement have some significance or
meaning? If the failure to comply with this requirement does not avoid
the sale, just what does it do? No other result flowing from a failure
to comply with this requirement suggests itself. Has not the rationale
of the court simply read this requirement out of the statute?
There is, moreover, some authority which would have declared the
sale fraudulent and void in the case at bar where one creditor was
omitted from the list. Walton v. Walter Fisher Co.,0° so held, not-
withstanding the sale was made in good faith and for value. In the
Walton case the Mississippi court said: "The purchaser takes the
goods at the peril of the statute not having been complied with. He
must see that it is complied with. The purpose of the statute was to
make the sale of stocks of merchandise in bulk prima facie fraudulent
as to the creditors of the seller. Such prima facie case can only be
107. There are two schools of thought as to the interpretation of bulk sales
statutes in a case of doubtful application. Some authority favors a strict view,as does the Tennessee Court: Overlin v. Karakapas, 44 Ohio App. 111, 184
N.E. 257 (1932). Other courts favor a liberal view in interpreting bulk salesstatutes: Re Dederick, 91 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1937); First Nat. Bank v. Sharp,
54 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1931).
108. See 37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 484, p. 1351 (1943); 24 AM. JuR.,
Fraudulent Conveyances, § 252, p. 358 (1939); and Note, 83 A.L.R. 1140 (1933).
109. 146 Miss. 291, 111 So. 364 (1927).
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met by the purchaser by showing that the statute was complied
with."" 0
The earlier Tennessee case of Cantrell v. Ring,"' should be noticed
in this connection. There the seller sued a purchaser who had con-
tracted to buy a stock of merchandise. The purchaser defended, among
other grounds, on the ground that seller -had omitted the name of a
creditor from the list of his creditors. The Tennessee Supreme Court
held that the seller could not recover from the purchaser since the
seller had omitted the name of a creditor, which was a violation of
the Bulk Sales Statute and thereby conclusively fraudulent.
12
110. 111 So. at 365.
111. 125 Tenn. 472, 145 S.W. 166 (1912).
112. This view expressed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee was later
criticized by the court of appeals in Arnold v. May, 10 Tenn. App. 315, 323-25
(E.S. 1929). The court of appeals takes the position in the Arnold case that a
failure to comply with the Bulk Sales Law will not constitute a sale fraudulent
in law unless there are creditors in existence whose rights were affected and
prejudiced by the sale.
